Jill and Jack have robbed a bank together and have unfortunately been caught.
The DA’s goal is to maximize conviction time.Upon entering the DA’s office, suspects are separated and isolated to prevent corroboration of falsified testimony.
To help achieve their goal, the DA often offers “plea bargain” deals to suspects in an attempt to extract corroborating information.
With no additional testimony, assume the DA has enough evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony to convict for 6 years total (say, 3 for Jack and 3 for Jill)
With additional testimony, the DA is able to convict for a full 10 years (split between Jack and Jill, again) which is clearly the worst case scenario for the family.
To demonstrate the payoff for each of these situations we'll use the payoff table on the right.
If Jack “rats” on Jack, and Jill stays quiet, Jack gets 1 yr, Jill gets the rem. 9 yrs.
It's important to note here that the first digit in the matrix corresponds to the payoff of jack. The second digit corresponds to the payoff associated with Jill.
If Jill “rats” on Jack, and jack stays quiet, Jill gets 1 yr, Jack gets the rem. 9 yrs.
Same here as well, the firsts number responds to Jack(-9) and the second number responds to Jill(-1).
If they both “rat,” they each get 5 years.
If they both stay “quiet,” the DA can only convict them each for 3 years.
We now begin "Game Theory". We have to look at each of the pairs in the matrix, and determine which location will be preferred for both
First let's just assume Jill has just gotten a disease, her to be able to talk at all. She will be quiet...
This means now we will be only looking at the Quiet column, from Jill.
Jack can still choose stay quite as well or rat jill out. In this situation, which of the pairs (Q,Q) or (R,Q) will make Jack better off.
Now let's assume Jill is going to rat no matter what. Let's say she has a panic attack and she spills everything about Jack ratting him out.
Again just like before we will have jill at the rat location. Jack will try to determine between staying Quit or Ratting Jill out as well.
Jill will Rat if Jack is quiet. Jill will Rat if Jack Rats.
Since“Rat” gives Jack a higher payoff in comparison to “Quiet” for every possible action Jill can take, he should never play “Quiet,” if he is a rational payoff (utility) maximizer.
As a result of all of this, we now know Jack will only play Rat.
Let's see what Jill would play.
Let's see now how Jill will respond to the choices Jack makes.
Again we begin by assuming Jack has the terrible disease that makes it impossible to talk. Jack can only be quiet.
This means we will be only looking at the Quiet column, from Jack. Jill can still choose to stay quite as well or rat jill out. In this situation, which of the pairs (Q,Q) or (Q,R) will make Jill better off.
Now let's assume Jill is going to rat no matter what. Let's say she has a panic attack and she spills everything about Jack ratting him out.
Again just like before we will have jill at the rat location. Jack will try to determine between staying Quit or Ratting Jill out as well.
Jill will Rat if Jack is quiet. Jill will Rat if Jack Rats.
Since “Rat” gives Jack a higher payoff in comparison to “Quiet” for every possible action Jill can take, he should never play “Quiet,” if he is a rational payoff (utility) maximizer.
As a result of all of this, we now know Jack will only play Rat.
Let's see what Jill would play.
As you can see the two columns end up intersecting at one point. That point is the 5,5 payoff where they both rat. That is the be